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1 Introduction
A high price of an invention is often observed, especially for the invention newly introduced to the
market. Then the price of this invention reduces gradually after a period of time. One reason
that causes the price to reduce is imitation activities, which result from technology diﬀusion. A
consumer who is attracted to this invention has two options. One is to purchase the product now
at a high price, and another is to delay the purchase and pay a lower price. The discussions related
to this issue, whether technology diﬀusion, the market competitiveness, or innovation activities,
are all connected to market frictions at some degree. The market frictions here are referred to
the ratio of produces to consumers. For example, the technology diﬀusion may result in imitative
activities and generate a more competitive environment for producers. An invention might speed
up the retirement of the current product, and hence, aﬀects the market frictions and the price
level. By looking insight the price pattern of an invention in dynamics, one can observe the
market frictions play a significant role, which motivates this exercise. Moreover, there exists a
price diﬀerential between the innovative and imitative products, which might also be aﬀected by
the market frictions.
The following two examples may support how the price diﬀerential caused by technology diﬀusion
products may depend not only on the quality of products but also the market frictions. The first
example is DVD players. By classifying the electronic devices into two groups in terms of the
quality, and the ease of use, the products produced by Sony, Panasonic, Hitachi and Toshiba may
be grouped together, called “innovative products”, and the products produced by other companies,
such as Oritron, may be grouped together, called “imitative products". Soon after Panasonic
introduced its single-disc DVD players, the companies in the same group, such as Sony, Toshiba
and Hitachi, have their DVD players on the shelves. This could be because all these companies
have their own research teams, which have similar facilities, technology and information of the next
possible inventions. It is worth mentioning that it took years for Oritron to shelve its DVD players
on the market, priced USD $130, compared to Toshiba at USD$160 and Panasonic at USD$180 at
the time. Note that Toshiba and Panasonic had reduced their prices after Oritron introduced its
DVD players.
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The second example is laptops. Again, by classifying the laptops into two groups in terms of the
design, functions and the quality of screens, we may have Sony’s laptops in one group and Compaq
in another. In 2005, Sony had more than 1200 diﬀerent types of laptops featured 40GB hard
drive, 1.0GHz and 256MB RAM at price USD$880 or more. Meanwhile, Compaq had 166 types
of laptops with the same features at price USD$724 or more. The price diﬀerential between Sony
laptops and Compaq laptops with similar features was approximately USD$156. For laptops with
more advanced features, such as 3.0 GHz, 512MB RAM, integrated wireless lan, and DVD±RW,
there are 7 types of laptops made by Sony at price USD$1880 or more, but none made by Compaq.
After having the DVD±RW feature replaced by CD-RW/DVD+RW, there are 2 types of laptops
made by Compaq at price USD$1499 or more. The price diﬀerential between Sony and Compaq
laptops with these more advanced feature had became approximately USD$381, which is more than
double the price diﬀerential with common features. Note that the innovators are more likely to
have products with the more advanced features for consumers to choose than the imitators. For
laptops, whether with advanced or common features, the innovators provide more types than the
imitators. Moreover, it does takes time for imitators to figure out how to imitate an advanced
feature, which is DVD±RW in this example.
So where do market frictions take place? Clearly, the introduction of an advanced innovative
product and/or an imitative product would aﬀect the competitiveness of producers and the price
levels, which may or may not have impacts on the price diﬀerential between innovative and imitative
products. This price diﬀerential, however, might aﬀect a consumer’s decision on purchasing. The
price a consumer would pay depends not only on the features of the laptop, but also on the group
in which she purchases. If it is a laptop with common features, Sony produces more varieties at a
higher price than Compaq does. If it is a laptop with the advanced features, such as DVD±RW,
Sony provides several types at a very high price, but Compaq provides none. The amount of
consumers shops in a group would certainly aﬀect the market frictions of that particular group, and
may aﬀect the price level of that group, which might have impacts on the price diﬀerential.
In addition to the market frictions, we cannot ignore the production costs, which are also
important in determining the price levels. The production costs for innovators include the research
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costs invested in innovations, and the costs for imitators would include the waiting time cost. To
shed light on how the market frictions and production costs, such as research costs and waiting
time, influence both innovative and imitative activities and the price diﬀerential, and on how the
innovation encouraging policies aﬀect market frictions and the price diﬀerential, I adopt a search
theoretical framework to address these questions.
The technology diﬀusion makes it possible for imitation and generate a more competitive mar-
ket. In the literature of technology diﬀusion, the endogenous growth framework is often adopted
to analyze how innovation and imitation might aﬀect economic growth. Under this framework,
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) find insuﬃcient innovative and imitative eﬀorts. Aghion, Harris,
Howitt, and Vickers (2001) find that a little imitation might enhance growth, but too much im-
itation may do the opposite. Rustichini and Schmitz (1991) discover that subsidies might cause
under-investment in both innovation and imitation sectors. Focusing on the interactions between
R&D activities and price patterns, Laing, Palivos, Wang (2002) find that market frictions is cru-
cial for the price structure and product diﬀusion pattern and that a more competitive market for
producers will enhance more R&D activities. While market frictions are not counted in Jovanovic
and MacDonald (1994) and Rustichini and Schmitz (1991), imitation activities is not included in
the analysis of Laing, Palivos, Wang (2002).
In order to look insights the price patterns in the presence of market frictions, I extend Moen’s
(1997) direct search-theoretic framework to analyze the innovative and imitative activities as well
as consumers’ shopping behaviors. Since the producers with similar production activities would
form their own submarket, there will be one innovative submarket and one imitative submarket.
The quality levels of products are assumed the same within a submarket, and may be diﬀerent
across sub-markets. Consumers are free to travel to either submarket to purchase. The market
frictions, defined as a ratio of producers to consumers, are crucial in determining the matching rates
of consumers and producers, and can be solved endogenously.
As a result, this model confirms that the diﬀerence of marginal costs of innovative and imitative
firms generates the price diﬀerential between the innovative and imitative submarkets. This is
consistent with the findings of Reinganum (1979). I also show that the price diﬀerential with
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endogenous market frictions would react to the change of quality the least, and the price diﬀerential
without market frictions would react to such quality improvement the most, compared to the price
diﬀerential with exogenous market frictions. The equilibrium market frictions and price diﬀerential
in the models with and without the extra production state for imitators have similar characteristics,
except the eﬀects of durability. A shorter durability would result in a wider price diﬀerential in the
model without the extra production state for imitators than in the model with the extra state.
Although both research subsidy and patent protection induce more reseach activities, their
eﬀects on the price diﬀerential and consumers’ and producers’ welfare are diﬀerent. In this de-
centralised economy without central planner and tax, the welfare is implied in the flow values of
consumers and producers. A research subsidy would generate more research activities and a more
competitive innovative submarket for innovators. Consequently, the price diﬀerential shrinks, and
consumers’ flow value are improved. This result with regard to the link of R&D activities and
market competitiveness is consistent with that of Laing, Palivos, Wang (2002). The patent pro-
tection, however, would widen the price diﬀerential, but it would hurt the imitators’ profits and
flow values, and may not improve the consumers’ flow values. Alternatively, the innovators could
take the advantage of the eﬀects of durability on the price diﬀerential by inventing products which
might influence the durability of the products currently hold by the consumers. The innovation
which reduces the durability of the old product would enlarge the price diﬀerential by benefitting
innovators more than imitators. This result provides an explanation on why the latest versions of
computer products are invented less convertible to older versions of windows or associated software
and hardware.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The environment of a general model with en-
dogenous market frictions is described in Section 2, followed by the equilibrium in Section 3. In
Section 4, the cases without market frictions and with exogenous market frictions are discussed and
compared to the general model. In Section 5, I introduce an extra production state for imitators
to examine whether the main results of the general model would sustain. Finally, conclusion and
possible extensions are provided in Section 6.
4
2 Environment (general model: with endogenous market frictions)
Following the direct search-theoretic framework of Moen (1997), I assume an economy with only
one type of good, which is indivisible. The economy is populated with a continuum of consumers
and a continuum of producers. Consumers are searching for producers to purchase products,
and producers are searching for consumers to sell products. Producers are distinguished by their
production activities. Innovators would invest in research activities to invent more advanced
products, while imitators would wait to imitate the most advanced products produced by innovators.
Since producers who conduct similar production activities would form their own submarket, all
innovators will form an innovative submarket (n) and all imitators will form an imitative submarket
(m).
The advancements of products are in terms of qualities. More advanced products are with higher
quality levels than less advanced ones. The concept of quality ladders, pioneered by Grossman and
Helpman (1991), is introduced to model the diﬀerent quality levels achieved by innovators and
imitators [Figure 2]. The quality level of products determines the utility received by consumers.
It is expected that the more complicated technology involved to produce an advanced product by
innovators, the longer waiting time it will be required to imitate such products by imitators. To
circumvent technological diﬃculties, the matching rate is assumed to depend on the market frictions,
which is defined as a ratio of producers to consumers.
2.1 Market frictions and matching technology
Let bi and si denote the mass of consumers (buyers) and producers (sellers) in sub-market i, re-
spectively. The flow of the matching functions between producers and consumers in submarket i
is x(si, bi), which is assumed concave (x0 > 0, x” < 0) and constant return to scale. Let θi denote
the market frictions of the submarket i, θi ≡ si/bi. A higher θi indicates a tighter submarket for
producers. Then the consumers’ matching rate in submarket i is d(θi) = x(si, bi)/bi = x(θi, 1), and
d0(θi) > 0, and the producers’ matching rate in submarkt i is e(θi) = x(si, bi)/si = x(1, 1/θi) and
e0(θi) < 0. Therefore, a higher θi gives a lower matching rate for producers and a higher matching
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rate for consumers.
limθ→0d(θ) = limθ→∞e(θ) = 0
limθ→∞d(θ) = limθ→0e(θ) =∞.
2.2 Consumers
Consumers are assumed homogenous and can enter either submarket without costs. Each consumer
has space to hold at most one unit of product, and free disposal applies. The consumers whose
space is empty are in the unmatched state (U) and the consumers whose space is filled are in the
matched state (M). The value function of a consumer in the U state is JU , and the value function of
a consumer in theM state is JM . Since consumers could match in either sub-market, JMi (i = n,m)
depends on the sub-market i from which the product is purchased. Let r denote the discounting
factor, the flow value of JU is the maximization of the expected flow value of changing to a matched
state:
rJU = d(θi)Max[JMi − JU ]. (1)
After purchasing from a producer, the consumer will enjoy utility ui from consuming the product
by paying price Pi1. Both ui and Pi are submarket specific. The price Pi of submarket i is decided
by the producers of that sub-market. For simplicity, the average durability (σ) of the product is
assumed the same across submarkets. This durability could be interpreted as the period of time
when consumers are satisfied with the product. This limited capacity of an individual means that
consumers do not return to the market when they are satisfied with the product. Therefore, the
arrival rate of consumers’ entry to the market would be 1/σ. The flow value of JMi is the net utility
from consuming the product and the expected flow value of changing the state back to U :
rJMi = ui − rPi +
1
σ
(JU − JMi ) (2)
1One could also assume that consumers receive diﬀerent utility levels for the same product. In this model, the
homogenous consumers would receive the same utility by consuming the products purchased in the same submarket
and pay the same price.
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Note that Pi is paid in full when the trade occurs rather than in several consecutive periodical
payments to the producer. However, the utility received by consumers is in every period. So the
discounting factor r appears in the price only.
2.3 Producers
In the retailer shops, the space to display one particular style of electronic devices is limited2 and
electronic devices are durable goods. Therefore, the shops often hold limited stock for each style.
For simplicity, I assume that each space displayed in the retailer shop represents a producer. Each
producer is assumed has space to hold at most one unit of product, so it will produce one unit per
time period and will not hold inventory over the period. Entering the market costs each producer
υ0i (i = n,m), which varies across submarkets. The producers are distinguished by production
activities. An innovator always invests sunk cost k in research, and a imitator has a delay process τ
to imitate the most advanced product produced by innovators. This delay process becomes the main
cause of the quality diﬀerential between innovators and imitators, according to the quality ladder
concept [Grossman and Helpman (1991)]. Let λ denote the exogenously determined economic
growth rate. Then the growth factor at period t is eλt. Without losing generality, when the
eﬀective value of quality level is q, then the delayed process would result in a lower quality level3:
qe−λt. This quality gap only exists across sub-markets, not within a sub-market. Both the research
investment and the waiting time for imitation are publicly observable, and no hidden information
exists with regard to the types of producers.
Following Moen (1997)4, all innovators in the model form an innovative sub-market and all
imitators form an imitative sub-market. These are the only two sub-markets in the economy
2For example, in a retailer shop, at most one laptop of each style is displayed on the shelves. Even for the electronic
devices in a small size, such as cameras and mobile phones, the space used to display is usually limited to at most one
for each style. Note that diﬀerent colors can be considered diﬀerent styles.
3Given λ and the growth factor eλt, by spending the whole period t on producing the product, a firm can achieve
the real value of quality level qeλt. Define the eﬀective value as the real value divided by the growth factor, then the
eﬀective value of quality level is q, and the eﬀective value of quality achieved involving the delay process τ is qe−λτ ,
and qe−λt < q .
4Producers with the same production activities are assumed to gather, share ideas with each other, and form a
sub-market of their own.
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[Figure 1]. Moreover, it is assumed that only products produced by the producers of that sub-
market will circulate in that sub-market, and there is no mix-up. Therefore, consumers who want
to shop innovative products would have to enter the innovative sub-market, for example.
The instantaneous production process is assumed for all producers, both innovators and im-
itators. That is, no delay between obtaining an idea and producing the product and no extra
production costs5. This assumption of instantaneous production leaves no production state. After
production, the producer is in an unmatched state (U), in which he holds this product and waits for
a consumer to trade. After trading with the consumer, the producer will conduct the production
activityand the instantaneous production allows the producer to return to the unmatched state (U)
right away. In this setup, there is no matching state for producers. One may argue that this may
not be true for imitators because of their delayed process. This argument will be addressed in Sec-
tion 5, in which the production state is restored for imitators, and it is shown that this assumption
is not crucial for the main results.
Having a product at hand, an innovator is now waiting for a consumer to trade with. With the
matching rate e(θn), the innovator will match with a consumer and receive the payment Pn, and
then return to the next research project. By investing k on research, the innovator will obtain a
new idea, has the product produced instantaneously, and returns to the unmatched state (U). Let
Π denote producers’ value function. The superscript of Π shows the state of producers, and the
subscript shows the sub-market where the producer locates. The flow value of an innovator rΠUn is
the net profit of selling the product in the innovative sub-market n:
rΠUn = −k + re(θn)Pn. (3)
An imitator, however, will wait for the innovative product to imitate. After seeing the innovative
products on the market, the imitator would spend time τ to figure out the idea to imitate. Once
is the idea of imitation obtained, production is completed instantaneously. This unavoidable time
cost lowers the quality level
¡
qe−λτ
¢
achieved by the imitator. With matching rate e(θm), the
imitator would trade with a consumer and receive Pm . Then he will return to the unmatched
5This assumption is for simplicity and wouldn’t change the main results since the costs of materials to produce
the products are similar for all producers.
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state (U) by spending time τ to figure out the next imitation idea and completing the production
instantaneously. Therefore, the flow value of an unmatched imitator is the expected payment of
matching with a consumer:
rΠUm = re(θm)Pm. (4)
2.4 Price announcement and market frictions
In each submarket, producers would decide a price Pi to announce, which maximizes their profits
subject to consumers’ flow value JU , which can be obtained by combining equations (1) and (2):
σd(θi)(ui − rPi)
r[σ(r + d(θi)) + 1]
= JU ,where i = n,m. (5)
Note that the entry condition, which is introduced in the next section, helps determining θi endoge-
nously. The costless entry to either submarket for consumers implies that the unmatched consumers
would feel indiﬀerent in entering either submarket. After trade, the combination of Pi and θi would
generate consumers’ flow value rJMi . Both consumer’s indiﬀerence curve and producers’ iso-profit
curves are depicted in Figure 3, which shows that innovators have a higher marginal rate of sub-
stitution between θn and Pn than imitators. It could be the research cost k that discourages the
innovators to exchange a lower Pn for a lower θn than imitators. For a given θi and JU , a producer
i chooses Pi to maximize profit ΠUi [equations (3) and (4)] and subject to J
U [equation (5)]. Let
ηi denote the elasticity of producers’ matching rate e with respect to the submarket frictions θi:
ηi = η(θi) ≡ −θie0(θi)/e(θi). The elasticity ηi (i = n,m) is assumed constant for all producers.
Then Pi (i = n,m) can be solved as a function of JU , ηi, and ui [see (A4) and (A5) in appendix].
3 Equilibrium (general model)
In equilibrium, without hidden information, none of the producers would deviate from its own type.
Meanwhile, consumers are indiﬀerent in purchasing products in either sub-market. Since the
durability is assumed to be the same across submarkets, the utility level in this model is generated
from the quality level of the product. This gives un = q and um = qe−λτ . As a result, this quality
diﬀerential (q− qe−λτ ) together with various submarket frictions (θi) are one of the main causes for
the price diﬀerential across sub-markets.
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Substituting equation (5) into the reduced form of Pi [equations (A4) and (A5)] gives:
Pn(θn) =
(1 + σr)(1− ηn)q
r[1 + σr + σηnd(θn)]
, (6)
Pm(θm) =
(σr + 1)(1− ηm)qe−λτ
r[1 + σr + σηmd(θm)]
. (7)
The entry cost of this model is exogenous and can be regarded as the sum of all types of transaction
costs involved to learn the knowledge and/or technology, which is required to become a producer, and
this cost is not the same for becoming an innovator and for becoming an imitator. Let υ0i (i = n,m)
denote the entry cost of being a producer. In equilibrium, the entry condition requires:
υ0i = Π
U
i , (i = n,m). (8)
By combining equation (8) with equations (3)-(4) and (6)-(7), we can get the equilibrium θ∗i (i =
n,m):
e(θ∗n) =
r(σr + 1)(υ0n + k/r)
(σr + 1)(1− ηn)q − rσηn(υ0n + k/r)θ∗n
, (9)
e(θ∗m) =
r(σr + 1)υ0m
(σr + 1)(1− ηm)qe−λτ − rσηmυ0mθ∗m
, (10)
where the possibilities of multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out, and every equilibrium satisfies
equations (5) and (8), and Pi = argmaxPi Π
U
i , i = n,m. Substituting equation (9) and (10)
into equations (6) and (7), the equibrium price diﬀerential of this general case can be derived [see
equation (13) in Section 4].
4 Results
To shed light on the role of market frictions on the price diﬀerential, I will discuss the case without
market frictions and the case with exogenous market frictions in this section and compare these two
cases to the general model, which is with endogenous market frictions and is derived in the previous
section. This is followed by the analysis on the eﬀects the innovation encouraging policies on the
equilibrium price diﬀerential and the flow values of producers and consumers.
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4.1 Case 1: without market frictions
The case withous market frictions means instantaneous matching between producers and consumers.
The price diﬀerential between submarkets
¡
∆P 1
¢
becomes:
∆P 1 =
q[1− e−λτ ]
r
. (11)
Equation (11) implies that without market frictions, ∆P 1 is mainly aﬀected by both q and τ , and
that an increase in either q or τ would enlarge ∆P 1. One explanation is that a higher q stimulates
consumers’ reservation price, which allows producers to charge more. This eﬀect would benefit
innovators more than imitators, and hence, enlarges ∆P 1. The longer the amount of time taken
to imitate, the lower the quality level that can be achieved by imitators. Thus, imitators have to
lower Pm to attract consumers, and causes a wider ∆P 1.
4.2 Case 2: with exogenous market frictions
With exogenous market frictions for both submarkets, the price diﬀerential of this case
¡
∆P 2
¢
becomes:
∆P 2 =
(σr + 1)(1− ηn)q
r[σ(r + ηnd(θn)) + 1]
− (σr + 1)(1− ηm)qe
−λτ
r[σ(r + ηmd(θm)) + 1]
. (12)
Equation (12) shows that the market frictions do aﬀect the price levels and ∆P 2, and allows the
durability of the product (σ) to play a role on ∆P 2.
The properties of ∆P 2 shows that both τ and q aﬀect ∆P 2 in the same direction as case 1,
but in a smaller size6, and that the eﬀects of q on Pi are also smaller in case 2 than in case 1.
This implies that the existence of market frictions restricts the producers to adjust Pi, and this
restriction is stronger on innovators than on imitators. Therefore, in response to an increase in q,
the size of an increase in Pn is smaller than in Pm in the presence of market frictions. As a result,
∆P 2 is smaller than ∆P 1.
Additionally, the existence of market frictions (θi) allows the durability σ as well as θi related
variables to play a role on ∆P 2. The θi related eﬀects are: the elasticity of producers’ matching
6The properties of ∆P 2 are: ∂∆P 2/∂q > 0, ∂∆P 2/∂τ > 0, ∂∆P 2/∂ηn < 0, ∂∆P
2/∂ηm > 0, ∂∆P
2/∂θn < 0,
∂∆P 2/∂θm > 0.
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rate ηi, and the consumer’s matching rate, d(θi). All three variables, σ, ηi and d(θi), have negative
impacts on Pi. The higher the ηi, the lower the Pi will be posted by the producers. A tighter
market for producers (a higher θi) would increase d(θi) and reduce consumers’ reservation price for
the product. Thus, producers have to lower Pi to attract consumers. Consequently, ∆P 2 would
shrink (enlarge), if the submarket n (m) gets tighter for innovators (imitators).
4.3 General model: with endogenous market frictions
Following what has been left in the general model (see Section 3), when the market frictions are
endogenously determined, the equilibrium price diﬀerential can be derived as:
∆P 3 =
(σr + 1)(1− ηn)q
r[1 + σr + σηnd(θ
∗
n)]
− (σr + 1)(1− ηm)qe
−λτ
r[1 + σr + σηmd(θ
∗
m)]
. (13)
When the direct eﬀects dominate, the properties of the equilibrium market frictions7 θ∗i (i = n,m)
allow us to provide insight on how the market frictions and the price diﬀerential are aﬀected by the
variables.
Equation (13) shows that q aﬀects both Pi and θi positively, and σ and ηi aﬀect both Pi and
θi negatively. The negative impacts of θi on Pi oﬀset the direct eﬀects of these three variables
(q, σ, ηi) on Pi. Therefore, the overall eﬀects of (q, σ, ηi) on Pi in the case with endogenous market
frictions is smaller than the case with exogenous market frictions.
The entry cost υ0i and the production costs, k for innovators and τ for imitators, would aﬀect Pi
indirectly via θi. An increase in υ0i discourages producers to enter the market and causes a lower
θi. This smaller θi would drive up Pi. While an increase in k would increase Pn through lowering
θn, an increase in τ may increase Pm through lowering θm. However, diﬀerent from υ0i and k, τ
has a direct negative eﬀect on Pm. When the direct eﬀect dominates, the lower quality level of
imitative products caused by a longer waiting time (τ) is suﬃciently strong to reduce Pm.
Comparing the price diﬀerential in all three cases, one can find that a change in quality diﬀer-
ential q would aﬀect ∆P 1 the most, ∆P 2 the second, and ∆P 3 the least: ∂∆P 1/∂q > ∂∆P 2/∂q >
∂∆P 3/∂q. This shows that the market frictions would reduce the eﬀects of q on the price dif-
7The equilibrium market frictions θ∗i (i = n,m) has the following properties: ∂θ∗i /∂q > 0, ∂θ∗i /∂v0i < 0, ∂θ∗i /∂ηi <
0, ∂θ∗i /∂σ < 0, ∂θ
∗
n/∂k < 0, ∂θ∗m/∂τ < 0.
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ferential. The endogenous market frictions would shrink the eﬀects even further. One finding
to emphasize is the negative eﬀect of durability (σ) on the price diﬀerential. An decrease in the
length of durability of the product σ would drive up both Pn and Pm. Interestingly, Pn would
respond more strongly than Pm. Consequently, the price diﬀerential is enlarged. In other words,
the innovators could take advantage of this negative eﬀects of σ on Pi by inventing products which
would reduce the durability of the products currently held by the consumers.
5 Discussion
5.1 Alternative model
In this section, I allow for an extra production state (P ) for imitators, additional to the unmatched
state (U), to examine whether the main results in the general model still hold. The main reason
for this extra state for imitators is due to the period of time that imitators have to wait for the
ideas to imitate. It is now assumed that after completing the production and having the product
at hand to sell, an imitator would change to the production state (P ) from the unmatched state
(U) [see Figure 4 for the environment]. Accordingly, the value functions of these two states are :
rΠPm =
1
τ
(ΠUm −ΠPm), (14)
rΠUm = e(θm)(rPm +Π
P
m −ΠUm). (15)
Smilarly, combining with the entry condition [equation (8)] to solve the equilibrium market frictions
(θA
∗
n , θ
A∗
m ), the equilibrium price diﬀerential (∆PA) can be solved:
∆PA =
(1− ηn)(1 + σr)un
r[1 + σr + ηnσd(θ
A∗
n )]
− [1 + τ(r + e(θ
A∗
m ))](1− ηm)(1 + σr)um
r{2[(1 + τe(θA∗m ))(1− ηm) + τr] + ηmτd(θA∗m )}
. (16)
The first and the second term of equation (16) shows PA∗n and PA∗m , respectively. The properties
of market frictions θA
∗
i (i = n,m) are similar to those in the general case, except for the eﬀects of
σ and ηm on θ
A∗
m . The overall eﬀect of σ on θ
A∗
m becomes positive, and the overall eﬀect of ηm
on θA
∗
m becomes ambiguous. In turn, the overall eﬀect of σ on PA
∗
m also becomes positive. Both
the general model and alternative model show the negative eﬀects of σ on the price diﬀerential,
and this negative eﬀects of σ on the price diﬀerential is stronger in the alternative model than in
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the general model. This is because an increase in durability this alternative model would increase
PA∗m , and shrink the price diﬀerential ∆PA
∗
further than the price diﬀerential in the general model,
∂∆PA∗/∂σ < ∂∆P 3/∂σ. One explanation is that in the general model without the extra production
state for imitators, the durability has two opposite eﬀects on P ∗i . On one hand, a higher σ delays
consumers’ next trip to the market, and causes the producers to reduce P ∗i to attract consumers.
On the other hand, a higher σ increases consumers’ reservation price, which allows the producers to
charge more. In the general model, the former eﬀect dominates, but in this alternative model, the
latter eﬀect dominates in the imitative submarket. This could be because the explicitly production
state for imitators implies that a higher σ buys imitators more time to develop imitative ideas while
consumers are still consuming their previous product.
5.2 The impact of innovation encouraging policies
The policies, such as research subsidy and patent protection, are often considered to encourage
innovation activities. In this section, I will focus on these two policies, and examine how such policies
might aﬀect the price levels, and whether such policies might improve the welfare of consumers and
producers. In this decentralized economy without a central planner, the flow values can be viewed
as the welfare of an individual.
One interesting finding is that although both research subsidy and patent protection achieve
the goal to encourage innovation well, they aﬀect the price diﬀerential in the opposite directions.
Moreover, these two policies have diﬀerent impact on the welfare of consumers and producers.
A research subsidy (a lower k) would lower Pn while leaving Pm unchanged, and shrink the price
diﬀerential. Therefore, a consumer could enjoy the innovative product at a lower price, and improves
her flow matched value
¡
JMi
¢
. Meanwhile, innovators flow value are improved as well. The patent
protection (a higher τ), howvere, would reduce an imitator’s flow value by lowering Pm, and enlarge
the price diﬀerential. Although a lower Pm might improve consumers’ matched value
¡
JMm
¢
, the
lower quality of imitative products would decrease JMm by reducing consumers’ utility level. Overall,
the patent policy may not improve consumers’ flow matched value JMm , but it certainly decreases
the imitators’ flow value while leaving innovators’ flow value unchanged.
Another interesting finding is the negative eﬀect of durability σ on the price levels and on the
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price diﬀerential. In order to charge a higher price and to enlarge the price diﬀerential, innovators
might want to invent products, which could retire the old products earlier. Taking computer
software as an example, a version of "windows" can last very long, and has diﬀerent software, such
as word and explorer, associated to it. From time to time, we are provided upgraded versions
of software, which are invented to be adapted to the newest version of "windows". Although
resisting upgrading the old windows, which is still workable, consumers are aware of the fact that
the old windows is becoming less likely to accommodate the latest versions of software and has
to be replaced or upgraded. So the invention of the latest versions of software, which are less
likely convertible to the old windows, have retired the old "windows" earlier. This might speed up
consumers’ next trip returning to the market, and allow the producers to charge more. Similarly,
the old computers without DVD drive, wireless len or USB drive might become not- upgradable at
some stage, and have to be retired earlier than expected. So the inventions of DVD drive, wireless
len and USB drive have shorten the period of time when consumers are satisfied with the product.
This might allow the producers of computers with DVD drive, wireless len, or USB drive to charge
more and enlarge the price diﬀerential. Therefore, the inventions that reduce the durability of the
old product would enlarge the price diﬀerential, and benefit the innovators more than imitators.
This might encourage innovative activities in return.
6 Conclusion and Extension
The search-theoretical framework allows us to shed light on the role of market frictions on the price
diﬀerential between innovative and imitative products and to examine the impact of innovation
encouraging policies on the welfare of producers and consumers. Interestingly, I find that the
market frictions would shrink the price diﬀerential, and endogenous market frictions would shrink
the price diﬀerential further than exogenous market frictions. The equilibrium market frictions and
the price diﬀerential in the models with (alternative model) and without (general model) the extra
production state for imitators have similar characteristics. Both the general model and alternative
model show the negative eﬀects of the durability on the price diﬀerential, and this negative eﬀects
is stronger in the alternative model than in the general model. The only exception is the eﬀect of
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durability, which becomes positive on the price of imitative goods in the alternative model. Thus,
a shorter durability would result in a wider price diﬀerential in the general model than in the
alternative model.
The innovation encouraging policies, research subsidy and patent protection aﬀect the price
diﬀerential and consumers’ and producers’ welfare, diﬀerently. . A research subsidy would shrink
the price diﬀerential and improve consumers’ welfare. The patent protection would widen the price
diﬀerential, but it would hurt the imitators’ flow values and may not improve the consumers’ flow
values. Alternatively, the eﬀects of durability could motivate the innovators to invent products
which might influence the durability of the existing products currently hold by the consumers. The
innovations which reduce the durability of old products could enlarge the price diﬀerential and
benefit innovators more than imitators. This result provides an explanation on the observations in
the electronic devices.
This model may be extended in several ways to analyze the innovative and imitative activities in
diﬀerent aspects. One is to have the price level determined by bargaining process. This may allow
the model to discuss how the price patterns matter to the innovative and imitative activities in
the presence of market frictions. Another possible extension is to allow for multi-unit capacity for
producers and consumers. This may enable the discussion on how innovators and imitators would
adjust the quantity to produce in response to the change of market conditions with and without
market frictions.
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Appendix
1. Figure 3: Derivation of the iso-profit curves and the indiﬀerence curves.
From value functions of innovators, imitators and consumers, the following equations can be
derived and signed:
∂θ
∂P
|ΠUn = −
e(θn)
e0(θn)P > 0;
∂2θ
∂P 2
|ΠUn =
e0(θn)e(θn)
[e0(θn)P ]2 < 0,
∂θ
∂P
|ΠUm =
(τr + 1)e(θm)
−[P (τr + 1)− τ ]e0(θm) > 0;
∂2θ
∂P 2
|ΠUm =
(τr + 1)2e0(θm)e(θm)
{e0(θm)[τ − P (τr + 1)]}2 < 0,
∂θ
∂P
|JU =
σd(θ)
σd0(θ)(U − P − r) > 0;
∂2θ
∂P 2
|JU =
σ2d0(θ)d(θ)
[σd0(θ)(U − P − r)]2 > 0.
Thus, Figure 3 can be depicted.
2. Solve Pi as a function of JU , ηi and ui:
Totally diﬀerentiate equations (3) and (4) with respect to Pi:
e(θi)
∙
1− ηi
µ
Pi
θi
¶µ
∂θi
∂Pi
¶¸
= 0, where i = n,m (A.1)
Consider the interior solution only, then the condition satisfying (A.1) is:
ηi
µ
Pi
θi
¶µ
∂θi
∂Pi
¶
= 1. (A.2)
Rearranging equation (5): d(θi) = θie(θi) =
r(σr+1)JU
σ(ui−rPi−rJU ) and totally diﬀerentiating (A.3) with
respect to θi and Pi give:
∂θi
∂Pi
=
rθi
(1− ηi)(ui − rPi − rJU )
(A.3)
Plugging (A.3) into (A.2), then Pi can be solved as a function of JU , ηi and ui:
Pn(θn) = (1− ηn)(
un
r
− JU ), (A.4)
Pm(θm) = (1− ηm)(
um
r
− JU ). (A.5)
3. Section 5: alternative model
Combining equations (11) and (17)-(18), the equilibrium market tightness (θA∗n , θ
A∗
m ) can be
solved:
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e(θA∗n ) =
(1 + σr)(vn0 + k)
(1− ηn)(1 + σr)un − σηn(vn0 + k)θA∗n
, (A.6)
e2(θA∗m ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2 (1 + τr) vm0 (1− ηm + τr)
+e(θA∗m )vm0 τ
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1 + τr)
£
2 (1− ηm) + ηmθA∗m
¤
+ [2 (1− ηm) + τr]
⎫
⎬
⎭
−e
¡
θA∗m
¢
um (1 + τr)2 (1− ηm) (1 + σr)
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
τ
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1 + τr) (1− ηm) (1 + σr)um
−τvm0
£
2 (1− ηm) + ηmθA∗m
¤
⎫
⎬
⎭
. (A.7)
18
References
Aghion, P., Harris, C., Howitt, P., Vickers, J., 2001. Competition, imitation, and growth with
step-by-step innovation, Review of Economic Studies 68, 467-92.
Jovanovic, B., MacDonald, G. M., 1994. Competitive diﬀusion, Journal of Political Economy 102,
24-52.
Grossman, G. M., and Helpman, E., 1991. Innovation and growth in the global economy. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Laing, D., Palivos, T., Wang, P., 2001. Product diﬀusion and pricing with market frictions, Economic
Theory 189, 1-30.
Moen, E. R., 1997. Competitive search equilibrium, Journal of Political Economy 105, 385-411.
Reinganum, J. F., 1979. A simple model of equilibrium price dispersion, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 87, 851-58.
Rustichini, A., Schmitz, J. A., 1991. Research and imitation in long-run growth, Journal of Monetary
Economics 27, 271-92.
19
Imitator (m) Innovator (n)
Imitative Commodity
sub-market
Consumers
e(θn)
d(θn)
e(θm)
Innovative  Commodity
Sub-market
d(θm)
Figure 1: Environment (without production state)
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Figure 4: Environment (alternative model-with production state for imitators)
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